Polycentric Development to Combat Regional Disparities? the Relation Between Polycentricity and Regional Disparities in European Countries by Evert Meijers & Krister Sandberg
Polycentric development to combat regional disparities? 
The relation between polycentricity and regional disparities 
in European countries  
 
Evert Meijers, Delft University of Technology, The Netherlands
1




Trends in regional disparities have been a major issue in regional science for many decades 
and knowledge of ways to overcome such disparities has great importance for regional policy-
making. Strong initial differences between regions affect the capacity of each region to grow 
and their ability to respond to challenges imposed externally, for instance globalisation and 
growing international competition and trade (Cuadrado-Roura, 2001). Initial differences can 
relate to a wide variety of factors, for instance the availability of human resources, the 
accessibility of a region and the presence of advanced production services. A factor that gets 
increasing attention is the city system. Flourishing regions can often count on a large, well-
accessible and internationally known city or regional clusters of cities. Concentration of 
support to dynamic growth poles would be an engine for growth of the whole country (or 
regions) through regional spillovers (Perroux 1955 and Kaldor 1970) 
Particularly also in regional and spatial policies addressing regional disparities attention is 
paid to the city system. It has been suggested that polycentric development can be 
instrumental to reducing regional disparities, see for instance in the European Spatial 
Development Perspective (CEC, 1999) and the Second Cohesion Report (CEC, 2001). In the 
Third Cohesion Report the main emphasis is territorial cohesion, which is placed on an equal 
footing as economic and social cohesion in the (unratified) Constitutional Treaty. Within the 
discussion on territorial cohesion polycentricity gets much emphasis (Faludi, 2005). Also 
many European countries pursue a polycentric development, often addressing the dominance 
of their prime city to diminish regional disparities. Apparently, policy makers assume a strong 
relationship between the urban system and the persistence of regional disparities. However, 
this assumption lacks empirical justification.  
The aim of this paper is to test the hypothesis that a polycentric city system leads to less 
regional disparities. The paper presents measures of the extent of polycentricity of the 
national urban systems of 25 European countries. This data is linked with calculations of 
regional disparities within these 25 countries. Are countries with a relatively polycentric 
urban system characterised by less regional disparities than more monocentric countries? 
And, what are the consequences of our findings for regional development policies?  
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  11. The urban system and regional disparities 
 
Trends in regional disparities have been a major issue in regional science for many decades and 
knowledge of ways to overcome such disparities has great importance for regional policy-making. 
Strong initial differences between regions affect the capacity of each region to grow and their 
ability to respond to challenges imposed externally, for instance globalisation and growing 
international competition and trade (Cuadrado-Roura, 2001). Initial differences can relate to a 
wide variety of factors, for instance the availability of human resources, the accessibility of a 
region and the presence of advanced production services. A factor that gets increasing attention 
is the shape of the city system as the fate of regions seems closely linked with the fate of cities in 
these regions. For instance, in the Second Cohesion Report (CEC, 2001) the European 
Commission emphasizes that cities are a key location for the pursuit of any strategy for cohesion. 
Evidence suggests that there is an important relationship indeed. Henderson (2000) reports a 
strong relationship between the level of urban concentration and economic growth for countries. 
Given that there are agglomeration economies and diseconomies, the urban agglomeration 
literature suggests that there is a best degree of urban concentration. Having established that 
there is a best degree of national urban primacy, which is related amongst others to per capita 
income and the population size of a country, Henderson finds that economic growth losses are 
large in the case of non-optimal urban concentration. ‘Non-optimal’ in most cases means 
excessive concentration (this includes European countries such as Austria, France, Greece, 
Ireland, and Portugal). There are also a few countries that show too little urban concentration, 
including the Netherlands and Belgium, which also negatively affects economic growth. Another 
finding is that urban concentration is more important for developing economies. In developed 
countries, de-concentration is increasingly efficient (Wheaton and Shishido, 1981; Hansen, 1990). 
In this contribution we aim to further explore the role of the shape of the urban system, in 
particular whether or not a polycentric urban system accounts for less regional disparities within 
countries.  
Regional and spatial policies addressing regional disparities increasingly pay attention to the city 
system often under the label of ‘polycentric development’. Central to the concept of polycentric 
development is that economic and/or economically relevant functions are distributed over the 
urban system in such a way that a multitude of urban centres rather than one or two gains 
significance (Meijers et al., 2005). Balanced urban or territorial development is a more or less 
synonymous term. It has been suggested that polycentric development can be instrumental to 
reducing regional disparities, see for instance the European Spatial Development Perspective 
(ESDP) (CEC, 1999) and the Second Cohesion Report (CEC, 2001). The preparation and 
publishing of the ESDP in particular has given a strong impetus to the spread of the idea of 
polycentric development among European countries. The main concern of this first EU policy 
document on territorial government, albeit informal and non-binding, is to combat existing 
regional disparities at the EU level. In order to arrive at a more balanced spatial structure its first 
main objective is the development of a balanced and polycentric urban system, as well as a new 
urban-rural relationship. It is argued that ‘the economic potential of all regions of the EU can 
only be utilized through the further development of a more polycentric European settlement 
structure’ (CEC, 1999, p.20). In the Third Cohesion Report the main emphasis is on territorial 
cohesion, which is placed on an equal footing as economic and social cohesion in the (unratified) 
Constitutional Treaty. Within the discussion on territorial cohesion the idea of polycentricity gets 
much emphasis (Faludi, 2005).  
Next to the European scale, also many European countries pursue a polycentric development, 
often addressing the dominance of their prime city to diminish regional disparities. An example is 
France that has a long tradition of combating the dominance of Paris (see Guigou, 2000; Baudelle 
& Peyrony, 2005). Ireland tries to develop ‘gateway cities’ in lagging regions in order to overcome 
its overdependence on Dublin (DELG, 2002; Davoudi and Wishardt, 2005). Also Greece, with a 
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contemporary policy gateway cities, as well as cities in corridors and bi-polar urban networks in 
order to strengthen medium-sized cities (Ministry of Environment, Spatial Planning and Public 
Works, 2002). The Polish ‘National Concept for Spatial Development’ (2001) aims at balancing 
spatial development in the long run, while accepting that the presently increasing disparities and 
polarisation are inherent to being in a transition phase. The assumption is that because of 
Poland’s stable and fairly polycentric urban system innovation and economic growth will ‘diffuse 
from the west towards east Poland, trickledown from the main urban centres to the surrounding 
zones and smaller towns, and penetrate territory along the main traffic corridors, forming belt-
like development zones’ (Korcelli, 2005, p.139) and hence, will eventually lead to balanced spatial 
development. Obviously, polycentricity is not just a descriptive term, but also a policy stance 
prescribing a means to promote and equalise economic growth (Hague and Kirk, 2003). 
Apparently, policy makers assume a strong relationship between the urban system and the 
persistence of regional disparities. A monocentric urban system, with a dominant city, often the 
capital, dominating over other cities would lead to divergence; while on the contrary, a more 
polycentric urban system would allegedly lead to convergence between regions. Not surprisingly, 
many European countries pursue polycentric development policies (Waterhout et al., 2005). 
Concentration of support to dynamic growth poles would be an engine for growth for the whole 
country and its regions through regional spillovers (Perroux, 1955 and Kaldor, 1970). 
However, this assumed relationship between a polycentric urban system and limited regional 
disparities lacks both a strong theoretical underpinning and empirical justification. The aim of 
this paper is to test the hypothesis that a polycentric city system leads to less regional disparities. 
The paper presents measures of the extent of polycentricity of the national urban systems of 27 
European countries. This data is linked with calculations of regional disparities within these 
countries. Are countries with a relatively polycentric urban system characterised by less regional 
disparities than more monocentric countries? And, what are the consequences of our findings for 
regional development policies? 
To answer these questions, we will first consider the theoretical rationale behind polycentric 
development. To do so, we discuss economic growth theories and their links with polycentric 
development in section 2. This is followed by an empirical analysis of the extent of mono- and 
polycentricity of European countries in section 3. Section 4 presents calculations of regional 
disparities within European countries. In section 5 we explore the link between the extent of 
mono- and polycentricity of a country’s urban system and the persistence of regional disparities. 
Finally, in section 6, we will discuss the implications of our findings and assess whether 
polycentric development strategies provide a valuable and feasible contribution to the 
diminishing of regional disparities.  
 
2. Regional economic growth and the urban system 
 
In this chapter, three dominating economic growth theories and their connection with 
polycentrism and regional disparities are presented. The natural choice is obviously the New 
Economic Geography (Krugman 1979, 1980 etc.) with components such as agglomerating and 
deglomerating factors, clustering, core-periphery, and specialisation, but the Neoclassical and 
Endogenous Growth theories should be considered for a general background to the discussion.   
 
Neoclassical Conditional Convergence Theory 
According to the neoclassical growth theory, growth is determined by rates of expansion of 
factor supplies and technological change. Income convergence is predicted by the equalisation of 
factor productivities and occurs as the result of four separate, but mutually reinforcing processes. 
The lead region accumulates capital faster than the other regions and will sooner or later 
experience diminishing returns. Investment in laggard regions will then become more attractive 
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Since conditional convergence occurs with a range of steady states being attained, regional 
disparities can be expected to narrow over time although they will never be completely 
eliminated. The neoclassical growth theory is not explicit about the role of the city structure. 
Since there are no reinforcement factors from the city structure on growth in the neoclassical 
growth theory, the city structure is a result of labour and capital movements. Hence, we may 
conclude that the theory does not take account of the urban system or does not consider the 
urban system as a factor in the convergence process. At best, polycentricism would result as an 
effect of economic growth. 
 
Endogenous Growth Theory
In the neoclassical growth theory the technological progress, the driving force behind long run 
steady state growth, is exogenously determined. By arguing that technological progress is itself 
determined by the growth process, endogenous growth theory extends the neoclassical model. In 
the original approach of Romer (1986, 1990) technology is attached to the labour force variable 
within the neoclassical production function so that the workforce is adjusted for knowledge. It 
also means that the pace of technological change is determined by the size of the labour force 
devoted to the production of ‘new ideas’. A region with a growing labour force experiences 
economic growth, exogenously as in the neoclassical way, and endogenously through the 
expansion in the labour force devoted to technological change and hence through improved 
technological innovation. The endogenous growth theory is more clearly connected with the city 
structure and may support polycentric development. It is also obvious that it favours a city 
structure with a high growth in cities with a high level of educated population. Obviously, this 
has provided a rationale for the establishment of many new universities in ‘peripheral’ cities so 
that technological innovation increases. This theory also explains ‘traditional’ regional 
development policies aiming towards a dispersal of population, and central government 
organizations etc. from the core towards the rest of the country. This then would lead to a more 
polycentric city system and a reduction of disparities.  
 
The New Economic Geography  
Krugmans work (1979, 1980) on new trade theory and subsequent work by Fujita, Krugman and 
Venables (1999), Ottaviano and Puga (1997), and Krieger-Boden (2000) has provided alternatives 
to the traditional theories on growth where the New Economic Geography (NEG), in a common 
frame, collect and merge together different perspectives on regional performance and 
development. Through the general equilibrium models NEG describes the economic landscape 
as a decentralised market process that considers scale economies, heterogeneity of products, non-
competitive markets, transport and transaction costs, factor mobility, and endogenous factor 
endowment.  
The NEG theories may be divided into two cumulative causation models (i.e., divergence 
theories). Firstly, the footloose-labour version, Krugman (1991a,b), argue that once a region gets 
a head start of some sort on other regions, manufacturing companies will be drawn to it. The 
reason is the ‘home-market’ effect – a larger region is attractive for firms seeking to exploit 
economies of scale while producing an array of differentiated products. The new firms in turn 
draw in mobile labour, a process which expands the population and hence home-market effect 
advantages even more. A further influx of both firms and labour can therefore be expected, 
creating a ‘virtuous circle’ of growth. Secondly, intermediate goods producers drive the 
divergence process in the vertically-linked industries models (Krugman and Venables, 1996; 
Venables, 1996). A head-start region can gain further advantages in the form of cost savings from 
close-input-output linkages as intermediate goods producers flock to join firms already exploiting 
a strong ‘home-market’ effect. Thus, more or less mobile factors are assumed to be the engine of 
any agglomeration process, and the factor endowment in the destination region is improved by 
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leads to ongoing in-migration of workers and companies driving a circular cumulative process. 
The factor endowments (centripetal and centrifugal forces) are therefore important for where the 
mobile factors are going to be located. Centripetal forces are technical increasing returns to scale, 
localisation economies, urbanisation economies, as well as home market and price index effects 
that – due to the saving of transport costs - increase factor incomes in agglomerations the more, 
the larger the agglomeration already is. Acting in the opposite direction are the centrifugal forces, 
such as scarcity of immobile factors, congestion costs, and the competition effect that – due to an 
increased supply of competing products - exerts the more pressure on factor incomes, the larger 
the agglomeration is. The relative strength of these two competing forces determines the location 
of production, Fujita et al. (1999).  
So, factor endowments are important for growth and location decisions and the magnitude of the 
factor endowments is in turn determined by the magnitude of the agglomerations. But since these 
factor endowments operate in opposite directions makes it hard to make any definite conclusions 
about the importance of the city structure on the reduction of disparities. It all depends on which 
factor endowment that dominates. If the agglomerating factors are dominating then a 
monocentric urban system would result that would reinforce this process. Seen from the 
perspective of regions, interaction evolves a core-periphery system where the economic centre 
(core) gets specialised in the sector with increasing returns, monopolistic competition, and a high 
income potential. By contrast, the periphery will get specialised in what is left, a sector with 
constant returns, perfect competition, and a low income potential, which is not subject to 
concentration. The hypothesis is then a monocentric city structure. On the other hand, in the 
case that deglomerating factors dominate, a reduction of city sizes possibly leading to a more 
polycentric city structure may be the case. Trade integration may also lead to spill-over in 
knowledge and thus bring about less specialisation through learning and imitation from the 
regional “capital” city to the surrounding periphery area, thus creating a larger area/population 
included in the region. Thus, concentration of support to dynamic growth poles would be an 
engine for growth of the whole country (or regions) through regional spillovers (Perroux, 1955 
and Kaldor, 1970) and thus as a way to reduce disparities.  
A feature of NEG growth models, which is important to remember about the interpretation of 
regional disparities in the EU, is that industrial clustering and divergence is not an inevitable 
outcome of these models. Krugman and Elizondo (1996), for example, develop a model in which 
gradually falling transport costs over time triggers first a process of cumulative growth (and hence 
divergence in disparities), followed by industrial dispersal to peripheral regions (convergence).  
The final conclusion from the review of economic growth models is that they are not very 
specific, if mentioned at all, about the development of the city structure and the role that this 
structure may have in reducing disparities. Therefore, the connections between regional 
economic growth, polycentricity and regional disparities as assumed by many governmental 
actors are rather poorly theoretically underpinned.  
Having established this, the next sections will explore the empirical underpinning of these 
connections. Does a polycentric urban structure actually have an impact on the persistence of 
regional disparities?  
 
3. Analysis of the extent of mono- or polycentricity of national urban systems 
 
Essentially, polycentricity is a scale-less phenomenon. The term has been applied to a wide 
variety of spatial scales ranging from Europe, to many of its countries, to regions and to cities. 
Basically, polycentricity refers to the plurality of centres in a given area. In a synthesis of the 
defining conditions of a polycentric urban region, Parr (2004) points, amongst others, at the 
separation of cities and the size distribution of cities. Indeed, morphological characteristics as the 
size and spacing of cities are determining factors in establishing whether or not any given area is 
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must be avoided. Rather than considering a given area polycentric or monocentric, it is more 
appropriate to score an area on a scale ranging from (very) polycentric to (very) monocentric. 
Here we will present two measures of mono/polycentricity for national urban systems. The first 
is based on the rank-size order of cities. The second measures the distribution of cities over the 
territory. In doing so we partly draw on the work carried out within the framework of the 
ESPON 1.1.1 project on polycentricity (Nordregio et al., 2004)
3, in particular using the ESPON 
1.1.1 data on functional urban areas in each country. Both measures will be combined in an 
overall index of monocentricity and polycentricity. 
 
Polycentricity and the rank-size distribution 
Characteristic for a polycentric national urban system is that no city dominates over other cities in 
economic, cultural and other respects. In other words, a polycentric urban system lacks strong 
hierarchy. Rather, characteristic for polycentric urban systems is that cities often tend to be 
relatively similar-sized. The rank-size distribution of the national urban system provides 
information on this hierarchy and is therefore an excellent indication of the extent of mono- or 
polycentricity. Figure 1 presents the rank-size distributions of three countries that are among the 
most polycentric (Germany), not polycentric nor monocentric (Sweden) and among the most 
monocentric (Greece). The data on population presented in the figure is for functional urban 
areas (FUA), not necessarily municipalities. They are delimited following national definitions (see 
Nordregio  et al., 2004). To be included in the database, FUAs should have at least 20.000 
inhabitants. Hence, when reference is made to cities, then the FUA is meant. Data was collected 
for either 2000 or 2001, depending on the availability in each country. Given the strong inertia of 
urban systems over time, data for one year presents a robust picture. 
  
Figure 1. Rank-size distributions of Germany, Sweden and Greece. 
 
Germany: Population (LG10) = 6,63 + -0,571*Rank (LG10) (R2 = 0,93), Sweden: Population (LG10) = 6,27 + -
1,118*Rank (LG10) (R2 = 0,97), Greece: Population (LG10) = 6,45 + -1, 894*Rank (LG10) (R2 = 0,95) 
Figure 1 clearly demonstrates that the main cities of Germany differ much less in significance 
than do those in Sweden or Greece. The gaps between cities in Greece are much larger, and 
Athens towers above the other ones. Also the primacy of Stockholm is larger compared to Berlin. 
The flatter the regression line in Figure 1, the more polycentric the urban system is. Conversely, 
the steeper this regression line is, the more monocentric a country’s urban system is. Therefore, 
the slope of the regression line is an excellent indicator of the extent of mono- or polycentricity. 
With a slope of the regression line of –0,571, the German urban system is relatively polycentric. 
Contrarily, the slope for Greece is –1,894 and hence its urban system is rather monocentric. The 
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monocentric for European standards. 
Obviously, the outcome of these calculations is influenced by the number of cities included in the 
regression analysis. In general, sample size can be a fixed number of cities, a fixed size threshold, 
or a size above which the sample accounts for some given proportion of a country’s population 
(see also Cheshire, 1999). The latter has disadvantages for this research, as it will turn out that the 
number of cities included in the analysis is large for polycentric countries and small for 
monocentric countries. Hence, the number of cities including some given proportion of the 
population is in itself an indicator of mono- or polycentricity and applying such a measure twice 
would distort the picture. A fixed size threshold is equally less appropriate as in large and more 
densely populated countries a city of say 50.000 inhabitants may be insignificant, while it could be 
of great importance in small or less populated countries. It could be argued that a city ranked for 
instance 10
th in a country is of importance in that country, despite its possible small size. 
Therefore, when measuring polycentricity on the basis of the rank-size distribution, the sample 
size could best be based on a fixed number of cities. The question then is what this number 
should be. The answer seems arbitrary by definition. Given that we will link the measures of 
mono/polycentricity with regional disparities, we could take the average number of regions in a 
country as a proxy, assuming that when each region would benefit from the presence of a 
significant city regional disparities could be less. The average number of regions (nuts 2) in a 
country is about 10. Therefore, we will base our calculations of mono- and polycentricity on the 
ten most populous cities in each country. The outcomes also correspond well with our tentative 
impression of the extent of polycentricity of a country, which is often based on a mere handful of 
cities. Moreover, calculations show that results for n=10 correlate strongly with sample sizes of 
n=5 or n=20. If a country did not have at least 10 cities, then all cities were included. However, 
countries with three or less FUAs (Luxemburg, Malta) were excluded. Data for Switzerland and 
Cyprus is included, although no data on regional disparities were available in time (CH), or not 
meaningful (CY). Therefore, our further analysis of the link with regional disparities concentrates 
on 25 countries. Table 1 presents the results of our calculations of mono- or polycentricity for 
the 27 countries included in this part of the analysis. 
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distribution. 
Country  N cities (FUA)  Mono/Polycentricity score    Ranking  
Germany     10  -0,571 1 Most polycentric
Slovak Republic  10  -0,589 2
Belgium 10  -0,591 3
Romania 10  -0,722 4
The Netherlands  10  -0,759 5
Poland 10  -0,773 6
Italy 10  -0,820 7
Hungary     10  -0,894 8
Norway 10  -0,991 9
Switzerland 10  -1,002 10
Bulgaria 10  -1,042 11
Czech Republic  10  -1,045 12
Finland 10  -1,088 13
Denmark 10  -1,116 14
Spain 10  -1,116 15
Sweden 10  -1,118 16
France 10  -1,119 17
United Kingdom  10  -1,203 18
Cyprus 4  -1,210 19
Estonia     10  -1,312 20
Lithuania 8  -1,316 21
Slovenia 6  -1,351 22
Austria 10  -1,440 23
Latvia 8  -1,576 24
Portugal 10  -1,599 25
Ireland     7  -1,887 26
Greece      10  -1,894 27 Most monocentric
 
According to their rank-size distributions, we find polycentric countries all over Europe, most 
notably northwest European countries such as Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands, but also 
Eastern European countries such as the Slovak republic, Romania and Poland. Italy is a clear 
example from southern Europe. The most monocentric countries such as Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal and Latvia, are found in the relative periphery of Europe. Ironically, it seems that some 
countries that have a rather polycentric urban system, for instance Belgium and the Netherlands, 
fear the lack of critical mass of their main cities and have developed strategies to promote clusters 
of proximally-located cities, so-called polycentric urban regions, e.g. the Randstad region (see for 
instance Van der Burg and Dieleman, 2004) and the Flemish Diamond (Albrechts, 1998). They 
try to present a more monocentric image internationally, with the Randstad and Flemish 
Diamond being the main cores in each country.  
 
Polycentricity and the spatial distribution of cities  
Next to the rank-size order distribution, also the spacing of cities is important. When all major 
cities would be clustered together in one part of the country, this could not be considered very 
polycentric, even when these cities would be of comparable size. Therefore, the spacing of cities 
is important. The more even spread over the territory, the more polycentric a country is. Note 
the difference with polycentricity on the regional scale, as exactly the opposite, clustering of cities 
together, is a characteristic of polycentric urban regions. The presence of such regions in 
countries may cause that the national urban system is less polycentric. For instance, the four main 
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even distribution would result in a more polycentric urban system on the national scale. Our 
interest in this paper is the link between polycentricity and regional disparities. The idea is that 
when each region disposes of a ‘dynamic growth pole’, every region will benefit from regional 
spillovers. Regions without a major city are less able to compete (inter)nationally. Therefore, we 
focused our analysis on the question whether subnational regions do have such a trump within 
their borders. For each country we took the number of nuts 2 regions. Then we examined in 
which regions the major cities of that country were located. The number of cities considered in a 
country was similar to the number of nuts 2 regions in that country. So, a country should be 
considered very polycentric when each region would have a major city within its borders. On the 
contrary, a country should be considered monocentric when a relative large number of regions 
would not have such a city within its borders. This implies that the major cities are concentrated 
in a limited number of regions. If a country was divided in less than 5 nuts 2 regions, then we 
included the nuts 3 division, hence also basing our set of major cities on this number of nuts 3 
regions. So, for example, Belgium is divided in 11 nuts 2 regions, so we examined the spread of 
the 11 most populous cities (FUAs) over these regions. These were located in 9 regions, so 2 
such regions had to do without a (top 11) major city. Therefore, Belgium scored 9/11= 0,818 on 
our measure. The results for all countries are presented in Table 2. No meaningful data could be 
calculated for Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta. 
          
Table 2. Extent of mono/polycentricity of European countries based on the spatial 
distribution of cities. 
Country  N nuts2 regions   Mono/Polycentricity score    Ranking  
Romania 8  0,875 1 most  polycentric
Hungary     7  0,857 2
Switzerland 7  0,857 3
Bulgaria 6  0,833 4
Belgium 11  0,818 5
Poland 16  0,813 6
Estonia     5*  0,8 7
Lithuania 10* 0,8 8
Austria 9  0,778 9
United Kingdom  37  0,757 10
Slovak Republic  8*  0,75 11
Ireland** 8*  0,75 12
Norway 7  0,714 13
Portugal 7  0,714 14
Germany     41  0,707 15
Denmark 15*  0,707 16
Greece      13  0,692 17
Latvia 6*  0,667 18
Spain 19  0,632 19
Czech Republic  8  0,625 20
France 26  0,615 21
Finland 5  0,6 22
The Netherlands  12  0,583 23
Italy 21  0,524 24
Sweden 8  0,5 25
Slovenia** 12*  0,5 26 most  monocentric
* Number of nuts 3 regions. 
** The number of FUAs with at least 20.000 inhabitants is less than the number of regions. 
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There is no European country in which major urban regions are fully evenly spread across the 
regions. Some countries come close, however. This holds for instance for Romania, Hungary, 
Switzerland, Bulgaria and Belgium. The opposite is true for Finland, the Netherlands, Italy, 
Sweden and Slovenia, although the latter country provides perhaps not a good picture, given the 
fact that it has far less FUAs (6) then regions (12). There is hardly a correlation with the measure 
of polycentricity based on the rank-size order (r=0,101). Figure 2 presents the scores on both our 
measures of polycentricity. For instance, The Netherlands and Italy score quite polycentric on the 
basis of their rank-size distribution, while they are relatively monocentric given the spread of 
cities over the country. Some countries come out polycentric on both measures. This includes 
Belgium, Romania and Poland for example. Latvia, Slovenia and Greece are monocentric by both 
measures. 
 
Figure 2. The relationship between polycentricity-indicators based on the rank-size 
distribution and the spatial distribution of cities across the national territory.     
 
 
An index of polycentricity 
We used the standardized z-scores on both indicators of polycentricity to construct an overall-
indicator for how monocentric or polycentric European countries are. A z-score of 0 was given a 
value of 100, and 1 standard deviation was given a value of 20. So, a z-score of –1 results in a 
value of 100-20=80. We calculated such values for both indicators for each country, and the 
mono/polycentricity index score presents their average value, see Table 4.  
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Country   Standardised  score 









Romania 121,33  131,39 126,36  most  polycentric
Belgium 128,34  121,03 124,69 
Hungary     112,02  128,14 120,08 
Poland 118,57  120 119,28 
Slovak Republic  128,45  108,6 118,52 
Germany     129,44  100,81 115,13 
Bulgaria 104,06  123,8 113,93 
Norway 106,79  102,09 104,44 
Estonia     89,5  117,72 103,61 
Lithuania 89,31  117,72 103,51 
United Kingdom  95,4  109,83 102,61 
The Netherlands  119,29  78,2 98,75 
Austria 82,61  113,66 98,14 
Denmark 100,06  93,4 96,73 
Czech Republic  103,92  85,8 94,86 
Spain 100,05  87 93,53 
France 99,93  84,05 91,99 
Italy 116,04  67,35 91,69 
Finland 101,59  81,24 91,41 
Portugal 74,01  102,09 88,05 
Latvia 75,3  93,4 84,35 
Ireland     58,5  108,6 83,55 
Sweden 99,95  63,01 81,48 
Greece      58,15  98,08 78,11 
Slovenia 87,39  63,01 75,2  most  monocentric
  
The next section presents findings on regional disparities for the countries listed in Table 4. In 
section 5 we will examine the relationship between these polycentricity scores and regional 
disparities.  
 
4. Regional Disparities 
 
In a recent overview of the discussion on regional convergence in the European Union, 
Cuadrado-Roura (2001) shows that empirical analyses of convergence trends often contradict 
each other. On the one hand, results of neo-classical analyses tend to underline a trend towards 
convergence (see for instance Sala-I-Martín, 1996) whereas on the other hand analyses lead to the 
conclusion that divergence, or increasing polarisation is the case (see for instance Magrini, 1999). 
The period under study provides part of the explanation of the different results. In general, from 
1960 to the mid-1970s regional disparities within the EU tended to decrease. Between the mid-
1970s and mid-1980s, this process comes to a halt, while in some countries (for instance France, 
Italy, Spain and the UK) disparities increase. In the decade following the mid-1980’s trends seem 
more or less stable as regional disparities within the then EU15 hardly improved. All in all, ‘from 
the end of the seventies, disparities have very slightly increased or decreased in the EU, so that 
the global trend is practically equal to zero’ (Cuadrado-Roura, 2001: 342).  
In this section, we will present data on regional disparities for the most recent years possible. 
Given the apparent stability of regional disparities, it seems that taking just one or some recent 
  11years into account still provides an accurate picture. A wide number of measures of regional 
disparities circulate in the literature (see for instance Portnov and Felsenstein, 2005). Here we 
restrict ourselves to some of the most common measures: the Coefficient of Variation (CV) and 
the Theil index.  
The Coefficient of Variation (CV) is a measure of dispersion of a probability distribution and 
often used when discussing the normal distribution for positive mean values with the standard 
deviation significantly less than the mean. It is defined as the ratio of the standard deviation to 





CV is a dimensionless number that allows comparison of the variation of populations with 
significantly different mean values. Normally it is reported on a scale from 0 to 100% after 
multiplying the ratio by 100. A high CV indicates large disparities between the regions.  
The Theil-index is calculated as  
 
where xi is the GDP of the ith region,  is the mean GDP, and N is the number of regions. The 
first term inside the sum can be considered the region's share of aggregate GDP, and the second 
term is that region's GDP relative to the mean. If every region has the same (i.e., mean) GDP, 
then the index = 0. If one region has all the GDP, then the index = lnN.  
Eurostat provided data on GDP per capita and unemployment rates at the nuts3 level, for the 
years 2000-2001-2002. Data was available for all member states of the EU, as well as for Bulgaria 
and Romania. No meaningful data on regional disparities could be calculated for the smallest 
countries (Luxembourg, Cyprus, and Malta). Norway does not have explicit NUTS regions so we 
instead used information on its 19 counties a level that approximately correspond to the NUTS3 
level. The actual data on GDP per capita in 2000 expressed as PPP is gathered from the study by 
Östbye and Westerlund (2004). Using this data we calculated the extent to which regional 
disparities are present within each country (that is, no reference is made to a European average). 
The results are presented in Table 5. Since both the CV and Theil-index measures yield similar 
results we therefore only illustrate the CV results in Figure 3 (CV GDP/capita) and Figure 4 (CV 
unemployment rates) for the year 2001. The CV for GDP per capita show that large disparities 
exists in Slovak Republic, Latvia , Germany, UK, Poland, Estonia and the Czech Republic while 
Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Slovenia, and the Northern countries have a low degree of GDP 
per capita disparities. A slightly different picture is presented for the unemployment rates, where 
large disparities appear foremost in Germany and Italy and to a slightly lesser degree in Belgium, 
France, Spain, and the Czech Republic. Small unemployment rate disparities are found among 
Greece, Lithuania, and the Nordic countries.  
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Table 5. Regional disparities in European countries in 2001. 
Country   CV  
GDP/capita 2001 
Theil-index  
GDP/capita 2001  
CV  
Unemployment 2001 
Austria  26,9 0,03 39,3 
Belgium 33,7 0,05 57,1 
Bulgaria 31,3 0,03 28,4 
Czech  Republic  41,3 0,06 44,5 
Denmark  26,1 0,03 21,9 
Estonia  45,1 0,07 33,1 
Finland  22,2 0,02 35,4 
France  35,6 0,04 44,3 
Germany  42,8 0,08 66,2 
Greece  31,9 0,04 16,5 
Hungary 37,5 0,05 34,2 
Ireland  26,5 0,02 22,7 
Italy  24,8 0,03 82,4 
Latvia  53,5 0,10 24,4 
Lithuania  25,0 0,03 10,4 
The  Netherlands  21,6 0,02 30,8 
Norway
1 10,6 0,01 21,9 
Poland  40,5 0,06 35,6 
Portugal
1 28,3 0,04 29,3 
Romania  32,1 0,04 35,2 
Slovakia 50,5 0,09 27,8 
Slovenia 20,4 0,02 33,8 
Spain  21,3 0,02 43,1 
Sweden  13,3 0,01 26,9 
United  Kingdom  45,0 0,07 39,5 
1 Data on GDP/capita is for 2000 
Source: Norway: Statistics Norway; other countries: Eurostat. 



























5. Analysis  
 
In order to see whether or not a polycentric urban system goes hand in hand with less regional 
disparities we calculated Pearson correlation coefficients for our measures of polycentricity and 
regional disparities. We used the two measures of polycentricity presented in section 3 and their 
aggregate, the total index score of mono/polycentricity. For regional disparities we included the 
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CV GDP/capita, the Theil-index GDP/capita, and the CV Unemployment rates, each for the 
three years, 2000, 2001 and 2002.  
We ran analyses with three sets of countries. In the first place, we took all 25 countries for which 
we have data available together. Second, we calculated correlation coefficients for just the former 
EU 15 countries. In the third place, we did the similar analysis also for the group of transition 
countries that recently accessed the EU (2004) or are scheduled to do so in 2007. In general, 
because of being in a transition phase, regional disparities tend to be higher in these countries.  
The results are presented in Table 6.     
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Table 6. Pearson Correlations between polycentricity indicators and disparity measures for GDP/capita and Unemployment rates at 
NUTS3 level. * indicate significance at 0.05 level, ** at 0.01 level.  
 
All countries  
(N=25) 
Former EU15 excl. Luxembourg 
(N=14) 
Recently accessed EU countries
1 + Bulgaria, 
Romania (N=10) 






















2002 ,340 ,054 ,451* ,011 ,655* ,464 ,107 ,035 ,139 
2001    ,352 ,110 ,413* ,105 ,611* ,518 ,120 ,100 ,106
CV  
GDP/capita 
2000    ,360 ,095 ,440* ,081 ,626* ,506 ,158 ,091 ,173
2002    ,325 ,114 ,368 ,209 ,592* ,599* ,013 -,030 ,044
2001    ,359 ,179 ,353 ,277 ,539* ,623* ,056 ,055 ,043
Theil-index 
GDP/capita 
2000    ,360 ,156 ,379 ,257 ,555* ,616* ,084 ,029 ,108
2002    ,222 ,476* -,147 ,611* -,060 ,510 ,078 ,346 -,154
2001    ,207 ,517** -,210 ,691** -,094 ,558* ,061 ,356 -,188
CV 
Unemployment 
rates 2000    ,230 ,507* -,149 ,647* -,210 ,436 ,275 ,439 ,077
1 Excluding Cyprus and Malta  
 
    
 
 
 The results of the correlation analysis lead to some interesting conclusions. In the first place, our 
index of mono- and polycentricity does not correlate significantly with the existence of regional 
disparities when we look at all countries or at the accession countries. However, there is a 
significant relationship between the former EU15 countries and regional disparities in terms of 
unemployment rates. This relationship is positive, thus the more polycentric a country is, the 
more regional disparities exist. Also the other significant relationships between one of the two 
measures of polycentricity (either based on the rank-size order distribution or the spatial 
distribution across the territory) indicates that a polycentric urban system does correspond with 
higher regional disparities than does a monocentric urban system. Such significant relationships 
were found between our polycentricity measure based on the rank-size distribution and the CV 
and Theil-index on GDP/capita, but just for the EU15 subset of countries. The uneven spatial 
spread of cities across a country’s territory correlates significantly with the GDP/capita for all 
countries, but, however, not for our two subsets of countries. Former EU15 countries with an 
uneven spatial distribution of cities as well as a relatively flat city hierarchy tend to have more 
regional disparities in GDP/capita according to the Theil-index. In general, relationships between 
the shape of the urban system and regional disparities are more common for the EU15 subset of 
countries than for the new member states and Bulgaria and Romania, where no significant 
relationships were found. We also ran an analysis of the former EU15 countries while excluding 
Germany, as we thought that this country may perhaps provide for a strange case given the 
reunion between East and West Germany in 1990. However, this only leads to slight adjustments 
of the values in Table 6. 
Once again, we would like to stress that as far as there are significant relationships between the 
shape of the urban system and regional disparities, these should all be interpreted as favouring 
monocentric city systems. Generally, the more monocentric a country’s urban system is the less 




Polycentric development rapidly has become a widely spread paradigm in regional development 
policies on a variety of spatial scales. Rather than the traditional redistributive policies of the 
1960s and 1970s, polycentric development policies emphasise the building on endogenous 
potential, developing regional organizing capacity, equal treatment rather than equality and a 
nodal approach rather than a zonal approach. It is generally considered a positive-sum game, and 
it tries to combine competitiveness and cohesion issues. Not surprisingly given these 
characteristics ascribed to polycentric development, it has been well received by policy-makers, in 
particular also on the European and national scale. As is the general case with new concepts, after 
the initial policy enthusiasm, the concept of polycentric development needs to be tested on its 
usefulness and validity if it is to sustain.  
This paper presented an empirical test of one of its main assumed promises, namely that of 
bringing about more cohesion. In practice, cohesion is generally equated with a lack of regional 
disparities. This paper explored whether a polycentric national urban system results in only 
limited regional disparities, or, the other way around, whether a monocentric urban system leads 
to large regional disparities. In doing so, the paper presents one of the first attempts to quantify 
the extent of polycentricity and monocentricity of national urban systems, thereby focusing on 
the distribution of city-sizes and the spread of cities across the national territory. These outcomes 
are linked with calculations of regional disparities within European countries.  
The outcomes of these correlations force us to temper the policy enthusiasm over the concept’s 
promise of bringing about cohesion. Between most of our measures of polycentricity (the rank-
size distribution; the spatial distribution over the territory; the overall index) and our measures of 
regional disparities there is no significant relationship. However, between some of our measures 
of polycentricity and some regional disparity measures we find significant relationships, either for 
  17all countries together or one of our subsets (former EU15; new member states + some accession 
countries). However, when there are some significant correlations, the direction of these 
relationships is completely opposite to what is generally expected. The more polycentric a 
national urban system is, the more regional disparities exist. Or, more monocentric urban systems 
are characterised by less regional disparities. This holds particularly for the former EU15 
countries. These findings are perhaps not surprising given our observation that theories on 
regional economic growth do not underpin the assumed relationships between a polycentric city 
structure and regional disparities either.  
There may perhaps be good other reasons for pursuing a polycentric development at the national 
or European scale. However, our results call for a critical reflection on the assumed link between 
polycentric development and its contribution to diminishing regional disparities. Why would one 
pursue a polycentric development for the sake of bringing about more cohesion when countries 
that are already characterised by a polycentric urban system do not have less regional disparities, 
or even, more such disparities?  
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